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Jurisdiction, the Internet, and the Good
Faith Exception: Controversy over the




In February 2015, the FBI discovered a website dedicated to
child pornography located on the Tor Network, a network de-
signed to protect its users’ identities on the Internet.  Due to the
structure of the Tor Network, the FBI could not take down the
website and identify users who previously accessed the website.
Instead, the FBI kept the website operational for 30 days and
applied for a search warrant in the Eastern District of Virginia to
use a device called a Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”).
This device operated similarly to malware and “attached” to
computers accessing the website, allowing the government to
identify individuals who accessed the website from districts
throughout the country.
The NIT proved successful in identifying numerous offend-
ers throughout the United States, many of whom are now chal-
lenging the validity of the NIT warrant.  Many of these
defendants claim that the magistrate judge in the Eastern District
of Virginia lacked jurisdictional authority to issue the warrant
under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b).  This very rule
was amended in December, 2016 to explicitly allow magistrate
judges to issue warrants outside their districts in cases where de-
fendants have concealed their locations through technological
means.
This Comment discusses how district courts have handled
motions to suppress evidence from the NIT warrant.  Most courts
have found that the NIT warrant violated Rule 41(b) but have
applied the good faith exception to the warrant requirement and
denied suppression of evidence seized as a result of the NIT war-
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law the Pennsylvania State Univer-
sity, 2018.
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rant.  This Comment addresses the amended Rule 41(b)’s possi-
ble retroactivity, as well as how courts should view the validity of
the NIT warrant if the amendment is not retroactive.  Lastly, this
Comment analyzes the applicability of the good faith exception
in light of the new amendment, the failure of the good faith ex-
ception to regulate magistrate judges who overstep jurisdictional
boundaries, and possible solutions to regulate magistrate judges’
conduct.
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I. INTRODUCTION
As crime continues to occur more frequently on the Internet,1
the government has sought new and creative ways to detect certain
criminal activity.2  The government has employed the use of certain
1. See Cara McGoogan, Dark Web Browser Tor Is Overwhelmingly Used for
Crime, Says Study, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 2, 2016, 2:35 PM), http://www.telegraph.co.
uk/technology/2016/02/02/dark-web-browser-tor-is-overwhelmingly-used-for-
crime-says-study.
2. Ellen Nakashima, This Is How the Government Is Catching People Who
Use Child Porn Sites, WASH. POST (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.
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devices known as “Trojan” devices, which purport to be harmless to
the users in order to invade computers and extract information.3 A
number of different types of Trojan devices exist, such as data ex-
traction software, Network Investigative Technique (“NIT”), re-
mote search, and Computer and Internet Protocol Address Verifier
(“CIPAV”).4
Trojan devices, specifically the NIT, provide a great benefit to
government investigators, as criminals frequently use anonymizing
software to avoid detection.5  Criminals are known to frequent cer-
tain areas of the Internet, such as the Tor Network.6  The Tor Net-
work’s structure makes tracking users through traditional means
virtually impossible,7 a subject that this Comment will discuss in
greater detail.8
Despite their utility in detecting otherwise hidden criminal ac-
tivity, NITs and other Trojan devices are controversial.9  As one
scholar notes in her article on Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
(FISA) Reform, “the privacy interests involved in NIT are substan-
tial.”10  In other contexts, courts have noted the degree of informa-
tion stored on computers and cell phones, and therefore the need to
protect these devices.11  In light of the volume of information stored
on electronic devices, the use of Trojan devices such as NITs is
alarming.12
Aside from the social concerns, a number of legal issues arise
with the use of NITs, not the least of which involve jurisdiction over
com/world/national-security/how-the-government-is-using-malware-to-ensnare-
child-porn-users/2016/01/21/fb8ab5f8-bec0-11e5-83d4-42e3bceea902_story.html.
3. Brian L. Owsley, Beware of Government Agents Bearing Trojan Horses, 48
AKRON L. REV. 315, 316 (2015) (citing Email message dated Aug. 24, 2005, https://
www.eff.org/files/FBI_CIPAV-14-p36.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015)).
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. McGoogan, supra note 1.
7. Susan Hennessey & Nicholas Weaver, A Judicial Framework for Evaluat-
ing Network Investigative Techniques, LAWFARE (Jan. 28, 2016, 10:17 AM), https://
www.lawfareblog.com/judicial-framework-evaluating-network-investigative-
techniques.
8. See infra Part II.A.
9. See Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO.
SOC’Y 599, 623 (2014) (discussing the different views on what level of protection to
give electronic devices in light of new methods of government surveillance).
10. Id.
11. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 964 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Elec-
tronic devices are capable of storing warehouses full of information. . . . Even a car
full of packed suitcases with sensitive documents cannot hold a candle to the sheer,
and ever-increasing, capacity of digital storage.”).
12. See Donohue, supra note 9, at 623.
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Internet users.13  In the Internet age, the traditional notion of juris-
diction based on geographical boundaries is far more difficult to
maintain.14  NITs and other Trojan devices function remotely,
reaching out and attaching to computers outside the district where
the devices are located.15  As one scholar points out, the FBI has
argued that the use of Trojan devices does not require jurisdictional
authorization.16  However, this assertion appears to fly in the face
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which outline and pro-
vide restrictions for jurisdictional authority of magistrate judges.17
No doubt, the use of Trojan devices presents the courts with unique
jurisdictional issues it must address.18
In February of 2015, courts were presented with an interesting
case involving a magistrate judge in the Eastern District of Virginia
who issued a search warrant allowing a search that extended
outside her district through the Internet.19  If NIT warrants require
jurisdictional authority, the next question is whether magistrate
judges can issue warrants outside of their districts.20  Courts do not
13. See United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2017) (discuss-
ing the jurisdictional limitations implied in Rule 41(b) affecting the validity of the
NIT warrant); United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 452 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(discussing the magistrate judge’s mistaken belief that she had jurisdiction to issue
the NIT warrant).
14. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The Rise
of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (discussing the breaking down
of traditional notions of geographic jurisdiction at the beginning of the Internet
Age).
15. See Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 7.
16. Owsley, supra note 3, at 315–16 (citing Email message dated Aug. 24, 2005,
https://www.eff.org/files/FBI_CIPAV-14-p36.pdf (last visited Mar. 8, 2015)).
17. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
18. See Donohue, supra note 9, at 623–24 (discussing the different views on
what level of protection to give electronic devices in light of new methods of gov-
ernment surveillance).
19. See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(discussing a magistrate judge’s mistaken belief that she had jurisdiction to issue
the NIT warrant); see also United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 369–70
(D. Mass. 2016) (discussing whether the magistrate judge had the power to issue
the warrant under Rule 41(b)); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL
4059663, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016) (discussing whether the magistrate judge
lacked jurisdictional authority to issue the NIT warrant under Rule 41(b)); United
States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016) (considering the magis-
trate judges’ authority to issue the NIT warrant); United States v. Michaud, No.
3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016) (discussing
the applicability of different subsections of Rule 41(b) to the NIT warrant in this
case).
20. Owsley, supra note 3, at 320 (discussing the various ways in which magis-
trate judges can have authority to issue a warrant within and outside of their
jurisdictions).
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agree on this issue.21  Courts also do not agree on whether the gov-
ernment should nevertheless be able to use the fruits of the search
based on the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.22
This Comment seeks to address a number of issues, including
the jurisdictional questions raised by the use of NITs.  Some articles
address the government’s use of NITs in a general sense.23  This
Comment will focus on a recent set of cases arising from a warrant
in the Eastern District of Virginia and the effect of the recent
amendment to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(b).24  Also, this Comment will
address how the amendment could change the application of the
good faith exception to these cases.25  Finally, this Comment will
discuss the exclusionary rule,26 the rule’s failure to regulate magis-
trate judges, and possible solutions to the issue of regulating magis-
trate judges’ conduct.27
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Playpen Website and the Tor Network
In December of 2014, the FBI received information from a for-
eign law enforcement agency regarding a website dedicated to child
pornography called “Playpen.”28  In order to access the majority of
the website’s content, visitors to the website logged in with a
username and password.29  In total, the Playpen website had over
150,000 users who created usernames and passwords to access the
website.30  Playpen contained tens of thousands of pornographic
images of children, which were “highly categorized” based on the
ages of the children as well as the types of activities depicted.31  The
website also contained forums that allowed the users of the website
21. See Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *8 (holding that the warrant did not vio-
late Rule 41(b)); see also United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34 (D. Mass.
2016), vacated, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017) (holding that the magistrate judge
lacked jurisdictional authority to issue the warrant under Rule 41(b)).
22. See Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 372 (applying the good faith exception);
see also Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 41–42.
23. See generally Owsley, supra note 3 (discussing Trojan devices and whether
they are authorized by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(b)).
24. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
25. See infra Part III.E.
26. See infra Part II.C.
27. See infra Part III.E.
28. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 593 (E.D. Va. 2016).
29. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 362 (D. Mass. 2016).
30. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
31. Id.
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to communicate ideas with one another about grooming32 victims
and avoiding detection.33
Based on the information provided by the foreign law enforce-
ment agency and information from its own investigation, the FBI
determined the location of the website’s operator and searched his
Florida home on February 19, 2015.34  The FBI then took control of
the website’s server on February 20, 2015.35
After taking control of the website, the government applied for
a search warrant in the Eastern District of Virginia to keep the
website operational.36  Normally, the government would be able to
“take down” the website and retrieve information regarding the
website’s visitors,37  but due to the website’s location on the Tor
Network,38 this was not possible.39  The Tor Network disguises its
users’ identification information by sending the information
through relay computers.40  On the Tor Network, the Internet pro-
tocol, or “IP” address,41 that would appear in an IP log is that of the
last computer in this chain of relay computers, not the computer
that accessed the website.42  Therefore, IP addresses cannot be
traced on the Tor Network.
Users can access the Tor network by downloading a Tor
browser.43  Some Internet content, such as “hidden services,”44 ap-
pears only on the Tor network, and users cannot find these websites
32. Grooming is a type of behavior often exhibited by sex-offenders which
involves developing a close relationship with a child and giving the child gifts and
special attention prior to molesting the child. See Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation,
Admissibility of Expert Testimony on Grooming Behavior Involving Sexual Con-
duct with Child, 13 A.L.R. 7th Art. 9 (2016).




37. The agent that applied for the search warrant explained the difficulties the
FBI encountered in overcoming the masking capabilities of the network specifi-
cally saying that “other investigative procedures that are usually employed in crim-
inal investigations of this type have been tried and failed or reasonably appear to
be unlikely to succeed if they are tried.”  United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp.
3d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (quoting the FBI’s application for a search warrant).
38. The word “Tor” is an acronym for “The Onion Router.”  For more infor-
mation about the Tor network, see Tor: Hidden Service Protocol, TOR PROJECT:
ANONYMITY ONLINE, https://www.torproject.org/docs/hidden-services.html.en.
(last visited Jan. 9, 2017).
39. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
40. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 361 (D. Mass. 2016).
41. An IP address is a unique code that identifies a computer or other device.
See Understanding TCP/IP Addressing and Subnetting Basics, MICROSOFT, https://
support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/164015 (last visited Dec. 8, 2017).
42. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358 at 361.
43. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
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using ordinary search engines.45 The Tor Network, originally cre-
ated by the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory to protect government
communications,46 is now reputed to be a haven for criminal
activity.47
Due to the challenges created by the Tor network in detecting
criminals, the government used a different strategy than it would
normally use in order to ascertain the IP addresses of those individ-
uals accessing the website.48  Even if the government successfully
located the IP logs for the Playpen website, the IP addresses on the
logs would reflect only the IP addresses of the last computers in the
“chain” of relay computers.49  The logs would not contain the IP
addresses of those accessing the website.50  While the government
could have “taken down” the website as it would normally do, the
anonymity of the Tor Network made it impossible for the govern-
ment to obtain the information it needed:  the users’ IP addresses.51
Due to the difficulties in obtaining criminals’ IP addresses, the
government chose to keep the website operational from February
20 to March 4, 2015.52  The government applied for a search war-
rant in the Eastern District of Virginia to use a device called a
NIT.53  The NIT functions similarly to malware,54 attaching to com-
44. The Tor network functions using volunteer-operated servers.  Signals from
one computer to another are sent through a circuit of these volunteer-operated
servers or “relay” computers.  This makes it difficult, if not impossible, for these
signals to be traced.  For more details, see TOR PROJECT: ANONYMITY ONLINE,
supra note 38.
45. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 593.
46. See TOR PROJECT: ANONYMITY ONLINE, supra note 38.
47. Researchers at King’s College in London found that 57 percent of web-
sites on the Tor network are used for criminal activity. See McGoogan, supra note
1.  Regarding child pornography specifically, in 2011, the “hacktivist” group Anon-
ymous took down the website Lolita City, which was a child pornography website
located on the Tor Network.  Sean Gallagher, Anonymous Takes Down Darknet
Child Porn Site on Tor Network, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 23, 2011, 7:00 PM), http:/
/arstechnica.com/business/2011/10/anonymous-takes-down-darknet-child-porn-
site-on-tor-network.  The takedown was part of Anonymous’s anti-child-pornogra-
phy effort called “Operation Darknet.” Id.
48. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
49. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 361 (D. Mass. 2016).
50. Id.
51. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 594.
52. Id. (“The FBI did not immediately shut Playpen down; instead, it assumed
control of Playpen, continuing to operate it from a governmental facility in the
Eastern District of Virginia from February 20, 2015 through March 4, 2015.”).
53. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 363.
54. “Malware” refers to “malicious software” or software programs designed
to do harm to computers.  Per Christensson, Malware Definition, TECHTERMS,
https://techterms.com/definition/malware (last visited Dec. 28, 2017).  The court in
Matish declined to consider whether the NIT actually is a form of malware, but
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK303.txt unknown Seq: 8  9-JUL-18 15:26
974 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:967
puters that access the website.55  The NIT did this by augmenting
content from the Playpen website with instructions that caused the
activating computers to transmit information like IP addresses.56
The NIT would deploy when users logged in with a username and
password.57  The NIT is made up of four parts, one of which is
called the “exploit.”58  The exploit has been compared to a person
opening a window to a house that the homeowner believed was
locked.59  The exploit allows other parts of the NIT to “enter” the
computer and extract data.60  Exactly how the exploit functions,
though, remains undisclosed by the government.61
The government used the information it gathered from the ex-
ploit in an affidavit prepared by a special agent.62  The affidavit in
support of the search warrant indicated that the NIT would cause
“activating computers” to reveal their subscriber information wher-
ever the computers were located.63  Therefore, the warrant author-
ized the government to search computers located outside of the
Eastern District of Virginia.64  The magistrate judge approved the
search warrant, and law enforcement deployed the NIT as
planned.65
After collecting IP addresses through the NIT, the government
subpoenaed Internet service providers to obtain the names and lo-
cations associated with the IP addresses.66  Ultimately, the NIT led
to the prosecution of 137 criminal cases.67  Defendants from a vari-
ety of districts have challenged this initial search warrant in the
Eastern District of Virginia in an attempt to exclude evidence from
subsequent searches.68  Due to the exclusionary rule, an attack on
found that malware is a good description for how the NIT functions. Matish, 193
F. Supp. 3d at 601–02.
55. See Nakashima, supra note 2.
56. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 364.
57. United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa. 2016).




62. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 363–64 (D. Mass. 2016).
63. Id. at 364.
64. United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *4
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Hennessey & Weaver, supra note 7.
68. See generally United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 438 (E.D. Pa.
2016) (considering defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his home);
see also Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d at 360 (considering defendant’s motion to sup-
press evidence gathered by the NIT search); United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43,
2016 WL 4059663 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d
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this initial search warrant would leave the government with no evi-
dence to further its case.69
One of the most popular challenges to the search warrant,
which has been accepted by various courts, targets the magistrate
judge’s lack of jurisdiction over defendants outside the Eastern Dis-
trict of Virginia.70  The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, partic-
ularly Rule 41(b), govern magistrate judges’ jurisdiction for issuing
warrants.
B. Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and its
New Subsection
Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure sets
forth a magistrate judge’s authority to issue a warrant.71  The Rule
currently contains six subsections, the sixth having gone into effect
on December 1, 2016.72
1. Rule 41(b) as it Appeared in February 2015
The first subsection reads, “a magistrate judge with authority
in the district—or if none is reasonably available, a judge of a state
court of record in the district—has authority to issue a warrant to
search for and seize a person or property located within the dis-
trict.”73  This subsection establishes the general principle that mag-
istrate judges have authority to issue warrants within their districts.
However, magistrate judges are not necessarily confined by the
bounds of their jurisdictions, which the remaining subsections of
Rule 41(b) demonstrate.74
Under Rule 41(b)(2), a magistrate judge can issue a warrant
for a “person or property outside the district if the person or prop-
erty is located within the district when the warrant is issued but
might move or be moved outside the district before the warrant is
585 (E.D. Va. 2016) (considering defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized
from his home computer); Michaud, 2016 WL 337263.
69. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that
evidence discovered by law enforcement through exploitation of an illegal search
may not be used against a defendant); see also Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 453
(acknowledging that the government would have no case without the evidence
from the NIT warrant).
70. See United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL
4212079, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016); see also Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6;
United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at
*22 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016).
71. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
72. Id.
73. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(1).
74. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
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executed.”75  This subsection could potentially apply to cases deal-
ing with the Internet, but much of the case law surrounding Rule
41(b)(2) does not apply to Internet searches.76
Under Rule 41(b)(4),77 a magistrate judge may issue a warrant
“to install within the district a tracking device; the warrant may au-
thorize use of the device to track the movement of a person or
property located within the district, outside the district, or both.”78
This exception to the general rule of Rule 41(b) applies in cases like
United States v. Jones,79 where the police attached a tracking device
to the underside of a car.80  However, courts often cite to 41(b)(4)
when confronted with NIT-related warrants.81  Congress’s intent
when drafting 41(b)(4) may have been to allow an exception to the
general rule in 41(b) for situations like the one in Jones, but
41(b)(4) could be interpreted more broadly to include cases dealing
with Internet jurisdiction.82  This Comment will address the argu-
ments presented by courts that have applied Section 41(b)(4) to the
NIT warrant used in the Playpen case.83
Under 41(b)(5), a magistrate judge “having authority in any
district where activities related to the crime may have occurred . . .
may issue a warrant for property that is located outside the jurisdic-
tion of any state or district.”84  For instance, a magistrate judge may
issue a warrant for property located in any U.S. territory, premises
owned by the United States, or residence or appurtenant land
75. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(2).
76. See Owsley, supra note 3, at 321; see also United States v. Krueger, 998 F.
Supp. 2d 1032 (D. Kan. 2014); United States v. Glover, 736 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir.
2013).
77. Omitted is a discussion of FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(3).  Under this section,
magistrate judges can issue warrants outside of their districts when there is “an
investigation of domestic terrorism or international terrorism.” FED. R. CRIM. P.
41(b)(3).  Historically, this subsection was a product of the Patriot Act and Con-
gress’s reaction to the attacks on September 11, 2001.  USA Patriot Act of 2001,
Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 219, 115 Stat. 272, 291 (2001).
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(4).
79. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012).
80. Id. at 403.
81. See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 612 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(finding that the warrant was authorized by Rule 41(b)(4)); see also United States
v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 370 (D. Mass. 2016) (discussing whether Rule
41(b)(4) could potentially authorize the use of the warrant); United States v.
Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28,
2016) (discussing Rule 41(b)(4) and noting that it “stretches the rule too far” to say
the NIT is like a tracking device).
82. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016) (find-
ing that the NIT is analogous to a tracking device).
83. See infra Parts III.D–E.
84. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(5) (emphasis added).
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leased by the United States.85  The broad language of this subsec-
tion, referring to “any district where activities related to the crime
may have occurred,” may allow a magistrate judge in a district
where a computer server is located to issue a warrant outside the
district but within a U.S. territory.86  For website searches, the ques-
tion posed by 41(b)(5) is whether the activity “occurred” in the dis-
trict that contains the computer server.  This subsection eliminates
the need for the object of the search to be located in the district, but
would not apply if activities related to the crime did not occur in the
magistrate judge’s district.87
2. The New Subsection of Rule 41(b)
Lastly, 41(b)(6) adds another situation where a magistrate
judge can issue a warrant outside his or her district.88  The language
of the new subsection reads:
A magistrate in authority in any district where activities related
to a crime may have occurred has authority to issue a warrant to
use remote access to search electronic storage media and to seize
or copy electronically stored information located within or
outside that district if:
(A) the district where the media or information is located
has been concealed through technological means; or
(B) in an investigation of a violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5), the media are protected computers that have been
damaged without authorization and are located in five or more
districts.89
The language of the new subsection appears to authorize magistrate
judges to issue warrants like the NIT warrant in the Playpen case.90
The subsection’s reference to “remote access” would apply to a
NIT, and “media or information” which “has been concealed
through technological means” would apply to the IP addresses hid-
den by the Tor network.91  However, this subsection was not a part
of Rule 41(b) at the time the NIT warrant was issued in the Playpen




88. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
89. Id.
90. United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va.
July 28, 2016) (holding that the proposed amendment “explicitly authorize[s] this
type of warrant.”).
91. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
92. United States v. Deichert, 232 F. Supp. 3d 772, 781 (E.D. N.C. 2017).
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2016.93  The question of whether this amendment will apply to past
cases presents a more difficult issue, which will be discussed later in
this Comment.94
C. The Good Faith Exception
In Weeks v. United States,95 the Supreme Court created what is
now known as the exclusionary rule, holding that evidence seized in
violation of the Fourth Amendment cannot be used in court against
a defendant.96  Decades later in United States v. Leon,97 the Su-
preme Court recognized the need for an exception to the exclusion-
ary rule where officers reasonably relied on magistrate judges’
findings of probable cause.98  In Leon, police officers reasonably
relied on a magistrate judge’s finding of probable cause in executing
a search warrant, though the District Court ultimately found that
probable cause did not exist under the circumstances upon which
the warrant was based.99  The Supreme Court noted that the exclu-
sionary rule was not part of the Fourth Amendment and was rather
a “judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amend-
ment rights generally through its deterrent effect.”100  Under the
good faith exception, suppression is warranted only if an officer was
reckless in drafting an affidavit, or if an officer could not have har-
bored a reasonable belief in the magistrate judge’s finding of proba-
ble cause.101
D. Cases Rejecting the NIT Warrant
Several courts have rejected the NIT warrant because they
found that it did not satisfy Rule 41(b) and that the good faith ex-
ception did not apply.102  In United States v. Levin,103 which has
since been vacated by the First Circuit, the District of Massachu-
93. Id.
94. See infra Parts II.E, III.A.
95. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
96. Id. at 398.
97. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
98. Id. at 922.
99. Id. at 905.
100. Id. at 906.
101. Id. at 922.
102. See United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 41-42 (D. Mass. 2016)
vacated, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Workman, No. 15-cv-
00397-RBJ-1 2016 WL 5791209, at *3–4 (D. Colo. Sept. 6, 2016); United States v.
Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, *22 (N.D. Okla.
Apr. 25, 2016).
103. United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26 (D. Mass. 2016), vacated, 874
F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK303.txt unknown Seq: 13  9-JUL-18 15:26
2018] NETWORK INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES 979
setts held that the NIT warrant violated Rule 41(b).104  For pur-
poses of 41(b)(1), the court was not persuaded by the argument that
the server was located in the Eastern District of Virginia.105  The
court said this argument was “immaterial, since it is not the server
itself from which the relevant information was sought.”106  Like-
wise, the court rejected the government’s argument regarding Rule
41(b)(2), saying that the property to be searched was the computers
outside the district.107  Lastly, the District of Massachusetts was not
persuaded that the NIT was similar to a tracking device and refused
to find that the NIT warrant satisfied Rule 41(b)(4).108
Not only did the District of Massachusetts in Levin find that
the warrant violated Rule 41(b), but it also refused to apply the
good faith exception.109  The Levin court found that the warrant
was void ab initio110 because the issuing court lacked jurisdiction.111
The Levin court noted that the Supreme Court has yet to apply the
good faith exception to a case involving a warrant that was void ab
initio.112  Ultimately, the Levin court found that the good faith ex-
ception does not apply where a warrant is void ab initio and granted
the motion to suppress.113  However, the First Circuit has since va-
cated this decision, finding that the good faith exception does ap-
ply.114  Other than acknowledging the district court’s argument, the
First Circuit did not otherwise comment on the whether the warrant
at issue was void ab initio.115
The District of Massachusetts was one of the first courts to
grant a motion to suppress evidence obtained through the NIT war-
rant, but subsequent to the District of Massachusetts’s decision in
Levin, other courts similarly granted motions to suppress.116  The





109. Id. at 41–42.
110. Ab initio means “from the beginning.” Ab initio, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
111. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d at 32.
112. Id. at 39 (“None of the Supreme Court’s post-Leon good faith cases,
however, involved a warrant that was void ab initio.”).
113. Id. at 35.
114. United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 324 (1st Cir. 2017) (“The district
court erred in granting the motion to suppress.  Because the executing officers
acted in good faith reliance on the NIT warrant, the Leon exception applies.  Ac-
cordingly, the district court’s order is vacated, and the case is remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.”).
115. Id. at 321.
116. See United States v. Arterbury, No. 15-CR-182-JHP, 2016 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 67091, at *22 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 2016) (finding that the NIT Warrant
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Northern District of Oklahoma cited Levin in support of granting a
motion to suppress.117  The District of Colorado also cited Levin in
support of suppression, only to be reversed later by the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals.118  The District of Colorado followed Levin
in finding that the good faith exception does not apply when a war-
rant is void ab initio.119
E. Cases Upholding the NIT Warrant
The district courts that have confronted cases involving the
NIT warrant have not yet reached a consensus; however, an appar-
ent majority has denied the motions to suppress.120  Also, the First,
Tenth and Eight Circuits have denied motions to suppress.121  Most
courts have denied the motions for one of two reasons:  either the
court finds that the warrant did not violate Rule 41(b),122 or the
court finds that the warrant did violate Rule 41(b) but finds that
suppression is not appropriate because the agents acted in good
faith.123
In United States v. Matish,124 the Eastern District of Virginia
found that Rule 41(b)(4), the exception for tracking devises, au-
thorized the NIT warrant.125  The court reasoned that the NIT was
violated Rule 41(b) because it did not satisfy any of the subsections) (citing United
States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28,
2016)).
117. Arterbury, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67091, at *35 (granting a motion to
suppress after finding that the warrant was void ab initio).
118. United States v. Workman, 205 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1261-62 (D. Colo. 2016)
(finding that the NIT Warrant did not fall into subsections one or two of Rule
41(b)), rev’d, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017).
119. Id. at 1267 (“Because a warrant that was void at the outset is akin to no
warrant at all, cases involving the application of the good-faith exception to evi-
dence seized pursuant to a warrantless search are especially instructive.”) (quoting
United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 41 (D. Mass. 2016) vacated, 874 F.3d
316 (1st Cir. 2017)).
120. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 623 (E.D. Va. 2016); see
also United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 440 (E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[T]he
courts generally agree that the magistrate judge in Virginia lacked authority under
Rule 41 to issue the warrant.”).
121. As discussed, the First Circuit vacated the District of Massachusetts in
United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316, 324 (1st Cir. 2017).  The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals reversed the District of Colorado in United States v. Workman, 863
F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017), applying the good faith exception and denying the mo-
tion to suppress.  The Eight Circuit Court of Appeals also denied suppression in
United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2017).
122. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612; see also United States v. Darby, 190 F.
Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016).
123. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 451–53.
124. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585 (E.D. Va. 2016).
125. Id. at 612.
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analogous to a tracking device and by accessing the website, the
suspects made a “virtual trip” to the Eastern District of Virginia
where the server was located.126
Shortly before deciding Matish, the Eastern District of Virginia
found in United States v. Darby127 that the NIT warrant was author-
ized by the exception for tracking devices.128  Also, the Eastern
District of Wisconsin in United States v. Epich129 found that the
warrant was authorized under Rule 41(b).130  Notably, the Eastern
District of Virginia in Darby and the Eastern District of Wisconsin
in Epich referred to the text of the new subsection of Rule 41(b) in
their opinions.131  Although the new subsection was not in effect
until December of 2016, the courts believed it was evidence of Con-
gress’s intent to broaden the reach of magistrate judges’ authority
under Rule 41(b).132
The District Court for the Western District of Washington took
a slightly different approach in United States v. Michaud,133 finding
that the warrant violated the “letter” but not the “spirit” of Rule
41.134  In other words, the court acknowledged Congress’s intent to
authorize a search like the one using the NIT warrant, but because
the plain language of the Rule 41 in 2015 did not explicitly author-
ize such a search, the court could not find that the warrant was au-
thorized by the Rule as it was written at the time.135
Although courts have been hesitant to find that the February
2015 version of Rule 41(b) authorized the warrant, courts have
been equally hesitant to allow suppression of the fruits of this war-
rant.136  The court in Michaud found that the NIT warrant violated
126. Id. at 613 (“Accordingly, when users entered Playpen, they came into
Virginia in an electronic manner, just as the police in Kyllo entered a home in an
electronic manner.” (citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001))).
127. United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520 (2016).
128. Id.
129. United States v. Epich, No. 15-CR-163-PP, 2016 WL 953269, at *2 (E.D.
Wis. Mar. 14, 2016).
130. Id.
131. See Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 536; see also Epich, 2016 WL 953269, at *2.
132. See Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d at 536 (“The government characterizes this
amendment as clarifying the scope of Rule 41(b), and this Court agrees.”); see also
Epich, 2016 WL 953269, at *2 (“Judge Jones noted, as an aside, that the Supreme
Court currently was reviewing a proposed amendment to Rule 41 that would ad-
dress this very issue.”).
133. United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
134. Id. at *6.
135. Id. (“The Court must conclude that the NIT Warrant did technically vio-
late Rule 41(b), although the arguments to the contrary are not unreasonable and
do not strain credulity.”).
136. United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
\\jciprod01\productn\D\DIK\122-3\DIK303.txt unknown Seq: 16  9-JUL-18 15:26
982 DICKINSON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 122:967
the letter of Rule 41(b), but nonetheless upheld the warrant under
the good faith exception.137  Also, the Eastern District of Penn-
sylvania in United States v. Werdene138 held that the warrant vio-
lated Rule 41(b) because it did not fit into any of the subsections.139
However, the court applied the good faith exception because “[a]
magistrate judge’s mistaken belief that she had jurisdiction, absent
any indicia of reckless conduct by the agents, does not warrant sup-
pression.”140  In Werdene, the court addressed at length the errors it
believed the District of Massachusetts made in Levin in refusing to
apply the good faith exception.141  The Werdene court particularly
noted that the Levin court failed to weigh the costs of suppres-
sion.142  The subsequent criticism of Levin appears to have led to
change, as the District Court for the District of Massachusetts has
more recently found that the good faith exception did apply to the
NIT warrant.143
In United States v. Anzalone,144 a different judge on the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts—the same court
that decided Levin—found that the warrant was not void ab ini-
tio.145  In fact, the court followed the reasoning of other district
courts and opined that even if the warrant was void ab initio, sup-
pression was still not warranted because the good faith exception
applied.146
Several new arguments are emerging regarding the proposed
amendment and the good faith exception.  Defendants in numerous
cases have argued that the good faith exception should not apply in
the Playpen case because the agents should have known the war-
rant was invalid.147  However, the Middle District of Florida in
137. Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *7.
138. United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
139. Id. at 442.
140. Id. at 453.
141. Id. at 450–51.
142. The Eastern District of Pennsylvania listed costs such as loss of trustwor-
thy evidence. Id. at 452 (“The court in Levin did not analyze the ‘costs’ associated
with suppression.  The Supreme Court has stated that these costs are ‘substan-
tial.’” (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1984))).
143. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 372 (D. Mass. 2016).
144. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358 (D. Mass. 2016).
145. Id. at 372.
146. Id. (citing United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016
WL 4212079, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016)).
147. See United States v. Henderson, No. 15-CR-00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL
4549108, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016); see also Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *8;
United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 28,
2016).
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United States v. Adams148 believed that the warrant does not fall
into the category of warrants that are so defective that the agents
could not reasonably rely on them.149  Also, the court believed it is
unfair to assume that the entire Department of Justice, including
investigators, had the same knowledge as Assistant U.S. Attorneys
regarding what constitutes probable cause.150  Courts cannot expect
law enforcement to understand the complexities of a law and its
amendments, and the court found that agents in the Playpen case
were correct to rely on the magistrate judge’s authorization of the
warrant.151
F. The Possibility of Retroactivity
One important consideration of Rule 41(b) is whether the new
subsection will be retroactive.  If the recent amendment to Rule
41(b) is retroactive, the new subsection will apply to cases pending
on direct review.152  At least one court, the District of North Caro-
lina, has already found that the 2016 amendment does not apply
retroactively.153  As discussed, the new subsection allows law en-
forcement to “use remote access” to search for electronically stored
information “located within or outside that district” in cases where
that information “has been concealed through technological
means.”154
Several of the district court decisions have already been ap-
pealed to the circuit courts.155  The circuit courts would have to ap-
ply this new subsection of Rule 41(b) if the Rule is retroactive.156
148. Adams, 2016 WL 4212079, at *8.
149. Id.
150. Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9.
151. Id.
152. See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 322–23 (1987) (“But after we
have decided a new rule in the case selected, the integrity of judicial review re-
quires that we apply that rule to all similar cases pending on direct review.”).
153. United States v. Deichert, No. 5:16-CR-201-FL-1, 2017 WL 398370, at *7
(E.D. N.C. Jan. 28, 2017).
[W]here the 2016 amendments to the Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure do not purport to apply retroactively, and where the current Rule
41(b) clearly does not embrace a Constitutional right that pre-exists the
2016 amendments, the analysis that follows evaluates the validity of the
NIT warrant under the Rules in effect February 20, 2015.
See also United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1047 (8th Cir. 2017) (applying
Rule 41 as it was written in February 2015).
154. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
155. See United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017); see also United
States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1051–52 (8th Cir. 2017).
156. See supra note 152.
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The “plain language”157  in Rule 41(b)(6) is fairly clear:  magistrate
judges are allowed to issue warrants outside their districts in exactly
the type of situation presented in the Playpen cases.  In the NIT
warrant cases, the IP addresses of the perpetrators accessing Play-
pen were concealed through the Tor Network,158 and the NIT uti-
lized remote access to attach to computers outside the Eastern
District of Virginia.159
Whether the proposed amendment will apply retroactively is
less clear.  In Griffith v. Kentucky,160 the Supreme Court held that
“[a] new rule for the conduct of criminal procedure . . . applies ret-
roactively to all cases, state or federal, pending on direct review or
not yet final.”161  In doing so, the Court declined to follow the
“clear break” rule,162 which states that a constitutional rule applies
retroactively only when it represents a clear break from past prece-
dent.163  In later cases, the Court specified that retroactivity applies
when the new rule is substantive in nature and not merely procedu-
ral.164  As to what makes a rule substantive in nature, the Court has
said that the rule must be one “without which the likelihood of an
accurate conviction is seriously diminished.”165  A rule is substan-
tive if it “alters the range of conduct or the class of persons that the
law punishes.”166  Whether the new amendment applies retroac-
tively will greatly impact the fate of the Playpen cases moving for-
ward on appeal,167 as later sections of this Comment will discuss.168
157. The “plain meaning” rule is a canon of statutory interpretation, applying
the literal language of the statute first before looking to outside interpretations.
See United States v. Ron Pair Enters., Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989).
158. United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp. 3d 358, 361 (D. Mass. 2016).
159. Id. at 363.
160. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 314 (1987).
161. Id.
162. See United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982).
163. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 326.
164. See Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 352 (2004) (“New rules of proce-
dure, on the other hand, generally do not apply retroactively.”).
165. Id. at 352 (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989)).
166. Id. at 353.
167. The Supreme Court in Teague declined to extend the rules regarding ret-
roactivity to cases on collateral review rather than direct review. See Teague, 489
U.S. 288.
168. See infra Part III.A.
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III. ANALYSIS
A. The Changes to Rule 41(b) Most Likely Do Not Apply
Retroactively
When defendants around the country began challenging the
NIT warrant, one argument many of them raised was that the viola-
tion of Rule 41(b) was constitutional in nature, therefore leading to
prejudice that would weigh in favor of suppression.169  Most courts
to consider this challenge found that Rule 41(b) is procedural in
nature and not constitutional or substantive.170  This characteriza-
tion, although not helpful in determining whether the warrant itself
is valid, is helpful in determining the retroactivity implications of
the amendment to Rule 41(b).  Because the majority of courts have
found that a failure to comply with Rule 41(b) produces a “techni-
cal violation,”171 the Rule is most likely not constitutional in nature.
The nature of the Rule also indicates that it is procedural.  The
Rule does not make certain conduct criminal or not criminal.172
The Rule also does not extend criminal punishment to a new class
of people.173  Rather, Rule 41(b) governs the authority over magis-
trate judges to issue warrants; an amendment to this Rule merely
expands the “manner of determining the defendant’s culpabil-
ity.”174  Therefore, the Rule does not affect the substantive nature
of any crime and therefore does not apply retroactively.
On the other hand, the District of Massachusetts in Levin
found that the Rule 41(b) violation was constitutional in nature and
not procedural.175  The Levin court reasoned that Rule 41 as a
whole has both substantive and procedural provisions and that sub-
section (b) is a substantive provision.176  The Levin court cited cases
169. See United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35-36 (D. Mass. 2016),
vacated, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017) (discussing the nature of the violation and
arguing that it is substantive in nature).
170. See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 622 (E.D. Va. 2016)
(holding that the violation was not substantive because it did not violate defen-
dant’s Fourth Amendment rights); see also United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-
05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016).
171. Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (“[T]he NIT Warrant did not fail for
constitutional reasons, but rather was the product of a technical violation of Rule
41(b).”).
172. As discussed earlier, Rule 41(b) involves the authority for magistrate
judges to issue warrants.  The rule does not reach the substance of specific crimes.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6). See supra Part II.B.2.
173. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
174. Schiro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 353 (2004) (noting that rules pertain-
ing to the “manner of determining defendant’s culpability” are procedural and not
substantive) (emphasis omitted).
175. See United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 35 (D. Mass. 2016).
176. Id.
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holding that Rule 41(b) is constitutional, noting that subsection (b)
is “unique from other provisions of Rule 41.”177
Though the possible retroactivity of Rule 41(b)(6) is not set-
tled, the Rule most likely does not apply retroactively.  The new
subsection does not extend the class of persons punished because it
discusses only the authority of magistrate judges.178  The Rule also
does not affect the substantive nature of a crime because it does not
discuss specific crimes at all; therefore, the rule is procedural.  As
discussed in the previous section, the Eastern District of North Car-
olina has already found that the new amendment does not apply
retroactively;179 for the reasons stated above, other courts should
find that the Eastern District of North Carolina is correct and the
amendment does not apply retroactively.
B. Denying Suppression Is Consistent with the Spirit but Not the
Letter of Rule 41(b)
Denying suppression of evidence gathered through these NIT
warrant searches is most consistent with Rule 41(b); as such, many
courts have denied suppression either by upholding the warrant or
applying the good faith exception.180  The arguments that the war-
rant did not satisfy Rule 41(b) are persuasive because they are
more consistent with the plain language of the Rule. The first five
subsections do not describe the use of “remote access.”181  None-
theless, the good faith exception should apply because the agents
justifiably relied on the warrant issued by the magistrate judge and
should not be penalized for the magistrate judge’s mistake.182
Given the plain language of Rule 41(b) at the time the NIT
warrant was issued, the NIT warrant in the Playpen case most likely
was not authorized by any subsection in Rule 41(b).  Though sev-
eral courts have found that the NIT warrant was akin to a tracking
device and therefore authorized under Rule 41(b)(4),183 at least one
177. See United States v. Krueger, 809 F.3d 1109, 1115 n.7 (10th Cir. 2015)
(quoting United States v. Berkos, 543 F.3d 392, 397 (7th Cir. 2008)).
178. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
179. See United States v. Deichert, No. 5:16-CR-201-FL-1, 2017 WL 398370,
at *7 (E.D. N.C. Jan. 28, 2017).
180. See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 623 (E.D. Va. 2016); see
also United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 453 (E.D. Pa. 2016); United
States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *5 (W.D. Wash.
Jan. 28, 2016).
181. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
182. See United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D.
Va. July 28, 2016) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the agents deliberately vio-
lated Rule 41(b)).
183. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 612.
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other court has criticized such a reading of Rule 41.184  Comparing
the NIT to a tracking device is, as some courts have pointed out, a
stretch of logic.185  Congress most likely meant Rule 41(b)(4) to au-
thorize physical tracking devices, like the GPS used in the Jones186
case, and not a device like the NIT.  Also, Congress would not have
amended the Rule had Congress already authorized warrants like
the NIT warrant; Congress would not have needed to take ac-
tion.187  Therefore, the majority position, that Rule 41(b) did not
authorize the warrant, is most consistent with the plain language.
Although the previous version of Rule 41(b) did not explicitly
authorize the use of a device like the NIT, subsection six would
plainly authorize a device like the NIT.188  As discussed earlier, this
subsection allows a magistrate judge to issue a warrant to use “re-
mote access” when the district where the information is stored has
been “concealed by technological means.”189  Therefore, if section
six applies retroactively, Rule 41(b) would almost certainly author-
ize the Playpen warrant.190  Assuming that Rule 41(b) does not ap-
ply retroactively for the reasons stated in the previous section,191
Rule 41(b) does not plainly authorize the use of the NIT warrant.192
Nevertheless, despite violating the plain language of Rule
41(b), suppression is still not appropriate.  The fact that Congress
later authorized the exact type of warrant in this case shows that
184. See Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (finding flaw in the tracking device
analogy since installation either occurred on the government computer, which was
never controlled by the defendant, or the defendant’s computer, which was never
located in the Eastern District of Virginia); see also United States v. Anzalone, 208
F. Supp. 3d 358, 370 (D. Mass. 2016) (finding that the NIT was not akin to a track-
ing device).
185. See Michaud, 2016 WL 337263, at *6.
186. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 403 (2012).
187. See United States v. Henderson, No. 15-cr-00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL
4549108, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016) (“Henderson argues that because it pro-
posed this amendment, the government was well aware that Rule 41(b), as it
stands, does not authorize the type of search conducted by the NIT Warrant.”).
188. United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D. Va.
July 28, 2016) (finding that the proposed amendment “explicitly authorize[s]” this
type of search); see also Owsley, supra note 3, at 315–16 (“Recently, the Depart-
ment of Justice proposed a change to Rule 41 to authorize search warrants for
Trojan devices in all types of criminal investigations.”).
189. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
190. See Owsley, supra note 3, at 315–16.
191. Supra Part II.A.
192. This is the position of most courts that have considered this issue. See
United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263, at *6 (W.D.
Wash. Jan. 28, 2016); see also United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 440
(E.D. Pa. 2016) (“[T]he courts generally agree that the magistrate judge in Virginia
lacked authority under Rule 41 to issue the warrant.”).
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Congress intended the Rule to allow this type of search.193  Further,
the agents took steps beyond what may have been necessary.  It is
unclear whether the use of the NIT was even a Fourth Amendment
search,194 meaning the agents who applied for the warrant were be-
ing cautious.  Overall, the NIT warrant cases present situations
where the good faith exception is critical. Given that the NIT war-
rant followed the spirit of the law, the agents had every reason to
believe the warrant was legitimate.195  Therefore, this situation is
not one in which the harsh consequences of suppression are
justified.
C. Policy Arguments in Favor of Denying Suppression
Issues of government surveillance present a delicate situation
where a court must weigh privacy interests against the importance
of the government’s ability to detect crime and protect the pub-
lic.196  At least one court found it necessary to discuss the policy
behind its decision regarding the Playpen warrant.197  The Matish
court acknowledged the need to consider privacy interests, but ulti-
mately found that the need for government surveillance outweighed
privacy interests.198  The Matish court noted the “especially perni-
cious nature of child pornography” and the “continuing harm to the
victims” as part of its reasoning.199  Notably, the court also dis-
cussed the technological race between the government and
193. This is the argument put forth in Darby.  United States v. Darby, 190 F.
Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016).  This argument does make it clearer that the
warrant violated the plain language but also that it followed the spirit of the law.
Id.
194. United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 621 (E.D. Va. 2016) (find-
ing that the government did not even need a warrant to use the NIT).
195. See United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D.
Va. July 28, 2016) (rejecting defendant’s argument that the agents deliberately vio-
lated Rule 41(b)).
196. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 621 (“[T]he Court recognizes the need to bal-
ance an individual’s privacy in any case involving electronic surveillance with the
Government’s duty of protecting its citizens.”); see Devin M. Adams, The 2016
Amendments to Criminal Rule 41: National Search Warrants to Seize Cyberspace,
“Particularly” Speaking, 51 U. RICH. L. REV. 727, 745-49 (2017) (discussing the
controversial process of introducing the amendment to Rule 41(b), due to its ex-
pansion of government power to search remotely); see also Zach Lerner, A War-
rant to Hack: An Analysis of the Proposed Amendments to Rule 41 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 18 YALE J. L. & TECH. 26, 69 (2016) (“Although the
amendments to Rule 41 merely seek to extend extraterritorial warrant authority to
two emerging cybercrimes, these changes, if unchecked, could effectively trans-
form remote access search warrants into ubiquitous surveillance tools.”).
197. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 621.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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criminals attempting to access child pornography.200  As the Matish
court indicated, “[t]he Government’s efforts to contain child
pornographers, terrorists and the like cannot remain frozen in
time.”201  The Matish court decided that the government should be
given some leeway to detect criminal activity, even if that involves
acting on a warrant issued out of the jurisdiction.202
The policy arguments set forth in Matish deserve some further
consideration.  One policy argument in favor of the defense is that
government surveillance could interfere with innocent third par-
ties.203  However, it seems that in the Internet age, jurisdiction as
well as privacy are slowly eroding.204  Just as the expectation of pri-
vacy test in Katz v. United States205 is becoming less effective now
that information is routinely stored on the Internet in the control of
third parties,206 geographic jurisdiction appears to be less rele-
vant.207  This lack of relevance is due in part to the fact that the
Internet itself is an undefined, non-geographic location.208  The
amendment to Rule 41(b) demonstrates Congress’s acknowledg-
ment of the trend towards erosion of traditional geographic juris-
diction209 because it gives magistrate judges even more power to




203. See Owsley, supra note 3, at 315, 317 (using the example of parents being
apprehended for the criminal conduct of their children on the home computer); see
also Lerner, supra note 196, at 55 (“[T]he amendments may adversely affect In-
ternet infrastructure, causing disruption to innocent third parties.”).
204. See generally Beth I. Boland & Diane Gwin, The Internet and Personal
Jurisdiction Under the Constitution:  In What State, Exactly, Is the Internet Lo-
cated?, 44 BOS. B.J. 16 (2000) (discussing different theories about where the In-
ternet is located geographically and the effects on personal jurisdiction); see also
Stephen J. Newman, Proof of Personal Jurisdiction in the Internet Age, 59 Am. Jur.
Proof of Facts 3d 1 (2016) (discussing the use of Internet presence as a basis for
personal jurisdiction).
205. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
206. See United States v. Perrine, 518 F.3d 1196, 1204 (2008) (“Every federal
court to address this issue has held that subscriber information provided to an
internet provider is not protected by the Fourth Amendment’s privacy expecta-
tion.” (citing Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 336 (6th Cir. 2001))).
207. See generally David R. Johnson & David Post, Law and Borders: The
Rise of Law in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367 (1996) (discussing the breaking
down of traditional notions of geographic jurisdiction at the beginning of the In-
ternet Age).
208. Id. at 1370; see supra Part II.B (discussing Rule 41(b) and the various
ways in which magistrate judges can exercise authority outside their jurisdictions).
209. The amendment allows for the use of “remote access” and is one of five
subsections that allow for magistrate judges to issue warrants affecting persons or
property outside their jurisdictions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b).
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Where some might look at the new concept of jurisdiction
skeptically, Matish highlights the rationale for giving more defer-
ence to the government in its investigation of criminal activity.210
Judges should take caution to not inadvertently allow the govern-
ment to access information belonging to innocent third parties.211
However, regardless of the risk to third parties in the government’s
quest for seeking out criminals, the court in Matish correctly found
that public safety is too valuable and outweighs potential infringe-
ments of third-party privacy in the context of eliminating child
pornography.212
D. Possible Ways to Ensure Magistrate Judges Do Not Overstep
Jurisdictional Boundaries
Another question that remains is what courts should do with
the evidence produced from the Playpen warrant once it has been
seized illegally.  Most courts faced with challenges to the NIT war-
rant have dealt with them in the context of granting or denying mo-
tions to suppress.213  Ever since its adoption in Weeks, the
exclusionary rule has been controversial.214  The aim of the exclu-
sionary rule, as discussed in the previous section,215 was originally
both deterrence of police misconduct and preservation of the integ-
rity of the judicial system.216  With the adoption of the good faith
exception, the Court appeared to affirm that deterrence is the main
justification for the exclusionary rule, if not the only justification for
it.217
210. See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 621 (E.D. Va. 2016).
211. Supra Owsley, note 3, at 315, 347 (“There is a danger that [Trojan de-
vices] will collect information not meant to be obtained from innocent third
parties.”).
212. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 621–22.
213. See United States v. Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 439 (E.D. Pa. 2016)
(considering defendant’s motion to suppress evidence seized from his home); see
also Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 592 (considering defendant’s motion to suppress
evidence seized from his home computer); United States v. Anzalone, 208 F. Supp.
3d 358 (D. Mass. 2016) (considering defendant’s motion to suppress evidence gath-
ered by the NIT search).
214. See Eugene Milhizer, The Exclusionary Rule Lottery Revisited, 59
CATH. U. L. REV. 747 (2010) (discussing the history of the exclusionary rule and
how it can be made better); see also Kit Kinports, Culpability, Deterrence, and the
Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 821 (2013) (discussing the lack of
clarity in case law regarding the exclusionary rule).
215. Supra Part II.C.
216. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393–94 (1914).
217. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 918 (1984).
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Deterrence in the form of excluding evidence has little effect in
the area of issuing warrants.218  For purposes of federal crimes,
magistrate judges are entrusted with the authority to issue warrants
based on a determination of probable cause.219  A magistrate
judge’s position is one of impartial neutrality;220 therefore, magis-
trates have no incentive to issue warrants that are faulty or lack
probable cause.221  For this reason, the judicial system trusts magis-
trate judges with the responsibility to issue warrants rather than re-
lying on law enforcement.  As the Supreme Court has said, “the
whole point of the [exclusionary] rule . . . is that prosecutors and
policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutral-
ity with regard to their own investigations.”222  Unfortunately, the
exclusionary rule then does little to deter magistrate judges.223  Be-
cause they are inherently impartial, magistrate judges have nothing
to lose from issuing faulty warrants.224  The Court created the good
faith exception based on the idea that law enforcement officers
should not be punished for mistakes made by magistrate judges.225
Given that the exclusionary rule has been associated with “sub-
stantial social costs,”226 it may be time to begin looking for a new
solution that will better serve the goals of the Fourth Amendment.
In particular, magistrate judges should be given more of an incen-
tive to not issue warrants out of their jurisdictions.  The current ex-
clusionary rule assumes magistrate judges have no incentive to issue
faulty warrants,227 but magistrate judges also have little incentive to
issue proper warrants because there are few consequences if they
fail to do so.228  One potential means to incentivize proper issuance
of warrants is to revise the Code of Judicial Conduct to make it
218. See id. at 917.
219. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(b)(6).
220. Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1979).
221. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (“Judges and magistrates . . . have no stake in
the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.”).
222. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 450 (1971).
223. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 917 (“The threat of exclusion thus cannot be ex-
pected significantly to deter [magistrate judges].”).
224. See id.
225. See id.  The Court did leave open the possibility that if the magistrate
judge has “abandoned his detached and neutral judicial role,” suppression may be
appropriate. Id. at 926.
226. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (discussing the fact
that the court has tried to narrow the scope of the exclusionary rule because it can
result in letting the guilty go free).
227. See supra note 221.
228. See George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth
of Magisterial Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 9 (1990) (“It is hard to imagine a
judge suffering at the polls for a tendency to issue too many warrants that have
uncovered evidence of criminal conduct.”).
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clearer that magistrates are not allowed to issue warrants that
clearly go beyond their jurisdictional authority and hence are void
ab initio.  By putting a provision in the Code of Judicial Conduct,
judges will have more of an incentive to ensure the warrants they
issue do not exceed their jurisdictional authority as set forth in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.  Even as recent amendments
expand this very authority, the lack of safeguards to ensure their
compliance with the rules is alarming.229
E. The New Subsection and the Good Faith Exception
The majority of courts have “saved” the NIT warrant on the
good faith exception alone.230  As discussed, many courts have
found that while the warrant violated the plain language of Rule
41(b), suppression is not justified.231  Some defendants have refused
to believe that the officers could have relied on the warrant.232  In
doing so, they invoke an exception to the exception:  officers cannot
be said to have relied in “good faith” on a warrant that is “so
facially deficient” that an officer cannot reasonably rely on it.233
Law enforcement officers are expected to have some understanding
of the law, but they cannot be expected to have the same degree of
knowledge as those practicing law.234  Therefore, depending on
whether the NIT warrant was “facially deficient” in light of the
amendment to Rule 41(b), the good faith exception may or may not
apply.
229. Even though Rule 41(b) explicitly allows the type of extraterritorial
search in this case, some have still suggested modifying the amendments to man-
date additional disclosure of the technical process the government plans to use to
obtain information outside its jurisdiction. See Lerner, supra note 196, at 67–68.
The hope is that adding this requirement would provide the judiciary with greater
transparency and mitigate harm to third parties. Id. at 67.
230. United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1051-52 (8th Cir. 2017) (overrul-
ing the Southern District of Iowa by upholding the warrant under the good faith
exception); see United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL
4212079, at *8 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016); see United States v. Werdene, 188 F.
Supp. 3d 431, 448 (E.D. Pa. 2016); see also United States v. Henderson, No. 15-CR-
00565-WHO-1, 2016 WL 4549108, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2016).
231. See Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 448; see also Henderson, 2016 WL
4549108, at *4.
232. See Henderson, 2016 WL 4549108, at *6; see also United States v. Eure,
No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *8 (E.D. Va. July 28, 2016); see also United
States v. Croghan, 209 F. Supp. 3d 1080, 1093 (S.D. Iowa 2016), rev’d, 863 F.3d
1041 (8th Cir. 2017) (following the District of Massachusetts in United States v.
Levin in saying that the good faith exception does not apply).
233. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984).
234. Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (“Defendant seeks to attribute to the FBI
agents that sought the warrant the legal expertise of the DOJ lawyers but nothing
indicates that these agents knew that the warrant might violate Rule 41(b).”).
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The addition of this new subsection has led to several vastly
different viewpoints.  At least one defendant has argued that the
amendment shows that Rule 41(b) could not have applied in this
situation.235  The amendment, in other words, makes it clearer that
Rule 41(b), as it read in February 2015, did not allow this type of
search.236  Congress added something new to the Rule;237 it would
not have done so had the Rule already permitted a magistrate judge
to issue a warrant to use a device such as a NIT.238  Still, many of
the district courts that have considered this issue believe that
knowledge of the proposed amendment and the potential effects on
the law is beyond the scope of what an ordinary law enforcement
officer is expected to know.239
Although law enforcement officers often have to make quick
determinations on legal issues such as probable cause,240 Rule 41(b)
concerns the authority of magistrate judges rather than the Fourth
Amendment.241  Officers are therefore less likely to be aware of
nuanced interpretations of this rule the same way they are aware of
Fourth Amendment interpretations.  Furthermore, the confusion
that the amendment has caused courts shows that the Rule’s appli-
cation is less than clear.242  If the courts cannot agree on whether
this particular warrant violates Rule 41(b), law enforcement could
not reasonably be aware that the warrant violated the Rule.243
Since the majority position is that the good faith exception applies,
235. Henderson, 2016 WL 4549108, at *6.
236. Id.
237. Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (“[T]he Department of Justice (“DOJ”)
had been seeking to amend Rule 41(b) to explicitly authorize this type of
warrant.”).
238. See Henderson, 2016 WL 4549108, at *6 (“Henderson argues that be-
cause it proposed this amendment, the government was well aware that Rule
41(b), as it stands, does not authorize the type of search conducted by the NIT
Warrant.”).
239. See id.; see also Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9.
240. See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 466 (2011) (“[T]he calculus of rea-
sonableness must embody allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments.” (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386, 396–97 (1989))).
241. See United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585, 610 (E.D. Va. 2016).
242. See Henderson, 2016 WL 4549108, at *6 (“[A] single court’s decision ana-
lyzing a complicated and ‘novel request’ does not definitively demonstrate that the
FBI deliberately disregarded the Rule.  Indeed, multiple courts have now found
that the NIT Warrant is valid under Rule 41.”).
243. See id; see also United States v. Scarbrough, No. 3:16-CR-035, 2016 WL
5900152, at *2 (E.D. Tenn. Oct. 11, 2016) (“The FBI agents can hardly be faulted
for failing to understand the intricacies of the jurisdiction of federal magis-
trates. . . . After all, there is disagreement among reasonable jurists on that very
question.” (quoting United States v. Ammons, 207 F. Supp. 3d 732, 745 (W.D. Ky.
2016))).
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it seems likely that courts will continue to uphold the warrant under
the good faith exception.
IV. CONCLUSION
The growing use of the Internet as a forum for criminal activity
has led to the use of creative techniques for criminal detection,244
some of which have caused interesting legal dilemmas.245  The use
of the Tor Network for criminal activity, such as child trafficking
and child pornography, leaves the government in a position where
it must either invade the privacy of its citizens through the use of
Trojan devices, or allow heinous crime to go undetected.246  Not
only is the government in a difficult position in having to choose
safety over privacy, but unclear rules have made it more difficult for
law enforcement to do its job and stop criminal activity.247  Luckily,
Congress has amended the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
make it clearer when magistrate judges can issue warrants outside
of their districts.248  In the meantime, it is most consistent with pub-
lic policy and the Court’s holding in Leon to admit the evidence
retrieved by the NIT warrant in the Playpen cases.
Several questions regarding Rule 41(b) have yet to be defini-
tively answered:  does Rule 41(b) authorize the use of remote de-
vices like the NIT?249  If not, does subsection six apply retroactively
to the NIT warrant issued well over a year before the amendment
went into effect?  If either of these questions can be answered in
the affirmative, then the NIT warrant is likely legitimate.250  Al-
though the district courts do not agree on the answers to these
questions, the Tenth, Eighth, and First Circuit Courts of Appeal
have thus far denied motions to suppress.251  Most likely, courts
244. See Nakashima, supra note 2.
245. See Donohue, supra note 9, at 623.
246. See Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d at 621-22.
247. See United States v. Eure, No. 2:16CR43, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (E.D.
Va. July 28, 2016).
248. See United States v. Darby, 190 F. Supp. 3d 520, 536 (E.D. Va. 2016).
249. See Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *8 (finding that the warrant did not vio-
late Rule 41(b)); see also United States v. Levin, 186 F. Supp. 3d 26, 34 (D. Mass.
2016) vacated, 874 F.3d 316 (1st Cir. 2017) (finding that the magistrate judge lacked
jurisdictional authority to issue the warrant under Rule 41(b)).
250. See Eure, 2016 WL 4059663, at *9 (discussing how the proposed amend-
ment explicitly allows the type of search that occurred in this case).
251. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the District of Colorado in
United States v. Workman, 863 F.3d 1313 (10th Cir. 2017), applying the good faith
exception and denying the motion to suppress.  The Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals in United States v. Horton, 863 F.3d 1041, 1048 (8th Cir. 2017), also denied
suppression.  Also, the First Circuit has vacated United States v. Levin, applying the
good faith exception and denying suppression.  United States v. Levin, 874 F.3d
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confronted with NIT warrant cases moving forward will continue to
follow the apparent-majority position of other districts and find that
the NIT warrant was not explicitly authorized by Rule 41(b) as it
was written prior to the December 2016 amendment.252
Even if the NIT warrant is not plainly authorized by the lan-
guage of Rule 41(b), the good faith exception is a remedy that can,
and should, be utilized.  The exclusionary rule has long been used
as a means of enforcing the Fourth Amendment by deterring un-
constitutional police conduct and was not intended to influence
magistrate judges’ conduct.253  However, the exclusionary rule has
been criticized by many, including the Supreme Court itself, be-
cause the rule can result in setting criminals free on mere
technicalities.254
In the Playpen case, the agents used the information available
and obtained a search warrant, giving them what they believed to
be authority to conduct the search.255  The NIT warrant authorized
a search to collect information necessary to obtain probable cause
for local search warrants of suspects’ homes in order to gather more
evidence.256  Therefore, suppressing the evidence gathered from the
original NIT warrant would force federal prosecutors around the
country to drop charges because evidence more clearly establishing
the guilt of these defendants would be suppressed.257  The policy
arguments against suppression are numerous; in the interest of jus-
316, 324 (1st Cir. 2017) (“Therefore, because the government acted in good faith
reliance on the NIT warrant, and because the deterrent effects on law enforcement
do not outweigh the great cost to society of suppressing the resulting evidence,
suppression is not warranted.”).
252. See United States v. Michaud, No. 3:15-cr-05351-RJB, 2016 WL 337263,
at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 28, 2016); see also United States v. Adams, No. 6:16-CR-11-
ORL-40GJK, 2016 WL 4212079, at *6 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2016); United States v.
Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d 431, 442 (E.D. Pa. 2016).
253. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 910 (1984).
254. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 591 (2006) (“The exclusionary
rule generates ‘substantial social costs,’ . . . which sometimes include setting the
guilty free and the dangerous at large.” (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 591)).
255. See Werdene, 188 F. Supp. 3d at 453 (“Once the warrant was issued, al-
beit outside the technical bounds of Rule 41(b), the agents acted upon an objec-
tively reasonable good faith belief in the legality of their conduct.”).
256. See id. at 438–39 (stating that law enforcement detected defendant
through monitoring the NIT); see also United States v. Matish, 193 F. Supp. 3d 585,
592 (E.D. Va. 2016) (“Defendant seeks to suppress ‘all evidence seized from Mr.
Matish’s home computer by the FBI on or about February 27, 2015 through the use
of a network investigative technique, as well as all fruits of that search.’” (quoting
Def.’s First Mot. to Suppress at 1)).
257. The doctrine of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” would effectively de-
stroy the government’s case because if the evidence from the NIT warrant is sup-
pressed, any subsequent warrants would lack probable cause.  Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (holding that evidence discovered by law enforce-
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tice, courts should apply the good faith exception and admit the
evidence obtained from the NIT warrant.
The exclusionary rule is not a perfect remedy to the problem of
enforcing the Fourth Amendment.258  As the NIT warrant cases
show, the exclusionary rule fails to regulate magistrate judges’ con-
duct because they are inherently neutral.259  Therefore, in order to
avoid the inequitable situation where the good faith exception con-
stantly saves invalid warrants, there should be a new remedy.  One
possibility is to create a provision in the Judicial Code of Conduct
that would prevent magistrate judges from issuing warrants outside
of their districts when they are not authorized to do so.  As the
Internet continues to affect geographic jurisdiction, it will only be-
come more necessary in the future to establish a way to prevent
magistrate judges from unlawfully extending their jurisdictions, as
was done in the Playpen case.
ment through exploitation of an illegal search may not be used against a
defendant).
258. See Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591 (2006) (“Suppression of evidence, however,
has always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”).
259. See supra note 223.
